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Nontechnical Summary
During the last two decades the design of fiscal relations across levels of government has
gained increasing importance in public finance literature and practice. In several in-
dustrial countries, and especially European Union member countries, competencies and
tax-raising powers have been transferred to regional and local levels of government. Also,
supranational institutions such as the World Bank, the United Nations or the OECD
are actively supporting fiscal decentralization in developing countries and East European
transformation countries with the aim of promoting economic and social development,
as well as efficiency and transparency in the public sector. At the same time, the inter-
est in the public finance literature in empirical studies of vertical fiscal structures has
considerably grown.
Within this context, an important problem encountered in comparing vertical govern-
ment structures is the appropriate measurement of public sector decentralization. Con-
ventional measures of the degree of fiscal decentralization widely used in the literature
relate expenditure and revenue of sub-central government to expenditure and revenue of
consolidated general government, as derived from financial statistics. However, without
taking into account the vertical structure of decision-making, the degree of decentraliza-
tion of the public sector tends to be misrepresented and both cross-country comparisons
and the description of long-term trends might be seriously distorted. Related to this,
erroneous measurement of decentralization may seriously bias particularly the results of
empirical studies using such fiscal indicators as explanatory variables and in the end may
lead to wrong conclusions.
Given this background, this paper gives a comprehensive analysis of the problems encoun-
tered in defining and measuring public sector decentralization and provides an overview
of recent international trends. In view of the predominant importance of the provision
with own financial resources for sub-national autonomy and the scope of public spending,
we focus on the revenue side of fiscal decentralization. Drawing on a recent analytical
framework provided by the OECD which classifies taxes according to the degree of lo-
cal discretion, alternative measures of tax autonomy and revenue decentralization are
constructed which take tax-raising powers of sub-central governments into account. The
degree of revenue decentralization is then measured by the share of sub-central govern-
ment revenue from taxes or other resources which are significantly controlled by them in
total revenue of consolidated general government.
The new contribution is twofold. First, using data reported by the Revenue Statistics
more recent figures on sub-national tax autonomy, as well as on the different indicators
of fiscal decentralization are presented for 23 OECD countries, including also countries
not considered in the OECD study. Second, taking account of changes in the assign-
ment of decision-making competencies for each tax in the course of time, we investigate
the long-term trend providing new time series of annual data on the degree of fiscal
decentralization of OECD countries in the time period between 1965 and 2001.
The comparison of figures based on different measurement concepts indicates that com-
mon fiscal indicators considerably overestimate the degree of fiscal decentralization or
fiscal autonomy in most countries. For countries like Austria or Germany where sub-
central governments have only limited autonomy upon taxation a drastically lower degree
of decentralization is reported as compared to measures drawing on unadjusted revenue
statistics. These findings contradict the common claim that federal countries are more
decentralized than unitary countries.
With respect to the development over time, both conventional and improved indicators
provide strong evidence for increasing fiscal decentralization in a majority of OECD coun-
tries during the last three decades. However, no uniform pattern could be determined,
several countries also exhibiting tendencies to centralize government activity.
To conclude, conventional expenditure and revenue shares are shown to misrepresent the
actual level of fiscal decentralization in a number of countries, therefore being unsuited
for cross-country comparisons. On the other side, even though differing considerably in
the magnitude, both conventional and adjusted fiscal indicators seem to perform well in
describing long-term trends in the public sector. Despite several shortcomings related to
aggregation and the use of budgetary data, when adjusted for decision-making structures,
expenditure and revenue shares still have the definite advantage of being operational.
The new data set provided in this paper therefore might contribute to improving empir-
ical studies on fiscal decentralization. Generally speaking, it seems reasonable to use a
set of different indicators instead of a single measure in order to represent the different
aspects of decentralization. However, the measure of decentralization to be selected in
empirical studies ultimately depends on the specific purpose of the investigation.
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1 Introduction
During the last two decades the design of fiscal relations across levels of government has
gained increasing importance in public finance literature and practice. In several indus-
trial countries, and especially European Union member countries, competencies and tax-
raising powers have been transferred to regional and local levels of government.1 Also,
supranational institutions such as the World Bank, the United Nations or the OECD
are actively supporting fiscal decentralization in developing countries and East European
transformation countries with the aim of promoting economic and social development,
as well as efficiency and transparency in the public sector.2
At the same time, the interest in the public finance literature in empirical studies of ver-
tical fiscal structures has considerably grown. Also trying to detect long-term trends in
public sector structures, this empirical literature deals partly with possible determinants
of public sector decentralization as derived from the theory of fiscal federalism.3 Other
studies focus instead on the possible implications of centralization for the size of the
public sector,4 economic and productivity growth,5 or good governance and corruption.6
However, an important problem encountered in comparing vertical government struc-
tures is the appropriate measurement of public sector decentralization. Despite several
shortcomings, the share of sub-national government expenditure or revenue in consoli-
dated general government expenditure or revenue is widely used as a proxy for the degree
of decentralization of the public sector. However, Oates (1972), among others, already
pointed to the limitations of using budgetary shares. Without taking into account the
vertical structure of decision-making, the degree of decentralization of the public sector
tends to be misrepresented and both cross-country comparisons and the description of
long-term trends might be seriously distorted. It is therefore not obvious that the above
mentioned world-wide increase in the sub-national government share of public expen-
diture and revenue actually reflects fiscal decentralization in terms of the devolution of
decision-making powers to lower levels of government.
Related to this, erroneous measurement of decentralization may seriously bias the results
of empirical studies and in the end may lead to wrong conclusions. This has been recently
confirmed by Ebel and Yilmaz (2003), who replicate previous studies and show that more
comprehensive measures of fiscal decentralization actually yield deviating results. Within
this context, measurement errors concerning decentralization as the independent variable
are more problematic in regression analyses than those concerning decentralization as the
dependent variable.7 Due to its importance, the measurement of fiscal decentralization
has been recently placed on the research agenda of international organizations like the
OECD or the World Bank.
Given this background, this paper focuses on the problems encountered in defining and
measuring public sector decentralization. The analysis draws on a recent study of the
OECD which provides a cross-country comparison of tax-raising autonomy of sub-central
governments. Based upon the analytical framework elaborated by the OECD, measures
of both fiscal autonomy and revenue decentralization are constructed which consider
1See, e.g., OECD (2002b, 2003).
2See the decentralization project of the World Bank described at www1.worldbank.org/wbiep/decentralization and
www.decentralization.org, and, also, OECD (2002a, 2002b) with respect to EU accession countries.
3See, e.g., Oates (1972), Wallis and Oates (1988), and, more recently, Panizza (1999), and Schaltegger and Feld (2001).
4See the empirical Leviathan literature, e.g., Oates (1985), or Feld et al. (2003), who also provide a survey on this
literature.
5See, e.g., Davoodi and Zou (1998), Thiessen (2003), or Behnisch et al. (2002).
6See, e.g., Arikan (2004), and Fisman and Gatti (2002).
7Greene (2000: p.375f), shows that as long as the independent variable is measured properly, measurement error on
the dependent variable can be absorbed in the regression disturbance and therefore ignored.
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tax-raising powers of sub-central governments. The new contribution is twofold. First,
more recent figures on sub-national tax autonomy, as well as on the different indicators
of fiscal decentralization are presented for 23 OECD countries. Second, taking account
of changes in the assignment of decision-making competencies for each tax in the course
of time, we investigate the long-term trend providing new time series of annual data on
the degree of fiscal decentralization of OECD countries in the time period between 1965
and 2001.
The analysis shows that common measures usually employed tend to considerably overes-
timate the extent of fiscal decentralization. For countries like Austria or Germany where
sub-central governments have only limited autonomy upon taxation a drastically lower
degree of decentralization is reported as compared to measures drawing on unadjusted
revenue statistics. This is in accordance with an earlier analysis of Blankart (1999) for
Germany. Based on this set of fiscal indicators and the analysis of institutional changes,
the development of the vertical government structure in OECD countries is therefore
investigated in terms of fiscal autonomy of sub-central government. Though no uniform
pattern of development could be determined, evidence is provided for increasing fiscal
decentralization in a majority of OECD countries during the last three decades.
The paper proceeds as follows. It starts with a discussion of existing concepts for mea-
suring public sector decentralization. In section 3, then, different indicators of fiscal
autonomy and revenue decentralization are derived. Based on this, sections 4 and 5
present new figures on fiscal decentralization for OECD countries and investigate possi-
ble long-term trends. Finally, the results are summarized and conclusions are drawn.
2 Measuring public sector decentralization
Public sector or fiscal decentralization is commonly associated with the assignment of
authority for public functions or finances to lower levels of government.8 Due to the com-
plexity of intergovernmental relations, measuring the degree of decentralization, however,
is a difficult task which bears many dimensions and which can hardly be accomplished
by using a single quantitative measure.9
Two important dimensions have to be taken into account when comparing vertical gov-
ernment structures across countries. The first dimension comprises the formal division of
functional responsibilities and revenues across levels of government. Within this context,
the range and the relative importance of the different functions and revenues assigned
to sub-national governments, as well as the extent to which government functions are
performed by the private sector determine the degree of fiscal decentralization.10
The second and most important dimension concerns the vertical structure of decision-
making, that is the extent to which decisions regarding functions and resources assigned
to lower levels of government are decentralized, too. A system where sub-central levels
of government have real autonomy to determine the allocation of their expenditure or
to raise own revenue is more decentralized than another system where local or regional
government spending and revenue is determined by national legislation, even though the
formal assignment of functions or revenues might be the same.
8The design of fiscal relations across levels of government is to be distinguished from political decentralization, that
is the extension of direct or indirect participation of the citizens in public decision-making through referendums or local
and regional elections. This form of decentralization does not necessarily imply the transfer of real fiscal responsibilities.
Also, the transfer of government functions to the private sector (privatization or contracting out), or, more recently, to
the non-profit sector can be interpreted as a distinct form of extensive fiscal decentralization.
9For example, Bahl (1986), or, Bird (1986) raise serious doubts regarding this.
10See Oates (1972).
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The common operational measures of fiscal decentralization used in cross-country com-
parisons relate sub-central government expenditure or revenue to consolidated general
government expenditure or revenue, thus weighting each government activity with the
corresponding budgetary share.11 This approach to quantifying public sector decen-
tralization, however, suffers from certain limitations. A key methodological problem is
associated with the use of aggregate measures. The difficulty consists in distinguishing
as to what extent the degree of decentralization reflects the assignment of functions and
resources to different levels of government, or, merely, the relative size of sub-central gov-
ernment activities. An increase in the measure of public sector decentralization might
be either due to a relative increase in the volume, or, else, in the number of public goods
provided by sub-central governments. The first effect merely describes a quantitative
effect, a shift in the budgetary shares of the different government functions – in general
caused by changing patterns of demand for public goods. In contrast to this, the second
effect implies what is generally referred to as true fiscal decentralization, namely the
reassignment of government functions in favor of the decentralized provision of public
goods.
A second problem is associated with measurement based on fiscal data. It is widely
noted that budgetary data in general, and expenditure and revenue shares, in particular,
are imperfect indicators of the share of public goods supplied by sub-central govern-
ments and the actual degree of decentralization of the public sector.12 First of all, the
vertical structure of decision-making with regard to public expenditure and revenue is
not accurately represented by public finance statistics. These report expenditure and
revenue figures at the level of government which ultimately operates or receives them,
irrespective of whether it has discretion upon them. Thus, expenditure mandated by
the central government or spent on behalf of the central government is reported as sub-
national expenditure. No distinction is also made between locally determined own taxes,
piggybacked or shared taxes, or between conditional and unconditional intergovernmen-
tal grants, all being reported as sub-central revenue and grants. It is therefore difficult
to interpret the unadjusted sub-national share of expenditure and revenue as reported
in financial statistics as an indicator of expenditure and financial autonomy.
Apart from decision-making structures, expenditure and revenue shares also fail to cap-
ture the extent of legislative and regulatory activities and other aspects of decentraliza-
tion which are not directly reflected in fiscal flows. Legislation and regulation is only
partly accounted for by expenses for personnel and implementation.13 Norms, minimum
quality standards, fiscal rules, and other qualitative restrictions imposed by the central
government on sub-central levels of government are not reflected in budgetary data, too.
Also, coordination among layers of government in the provision of public goods and joint
financing are difficult to be taken into account quantitatively. However, it is not obvious
whether budgetary statistics will generally tend to under- or overestimate the scope of
central government activities, and, thus, the actual degree of fiscal decentralization.
In order to account for the multiple aspects of decentralization, different non-quantitative
measures have been proposed in the literature, too. Kaufman (1963) compiles a list of
indicators measuring the degree of central government control over sub-national gov-
11Most empirical studies rely on budgetary data reported by the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) of the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund. See, among others, Levin (1990), Panizza (1999), Thiessen (2003), Min˜ana (1998), and Rahmann
et al. (1994). A description of the data and the methodology can be found in IMF (2001). Some studies also use National
Accounts statistics of the UN, such as Oates (1972), and Pommerehne (1977), or of the OECD, such as Patsouratis
(1990), or the World Tables reported by the World Bank. These statistics, however, encounter certain limitations and
lack especially more recent data. Note also that indicators based solely on public consumption data tend to overestimate
the degree of decentralization, since redistributive transfers of central government are not taken into account.
12See, e.g., Oates (1972), Levin (1990), Wasylenko (1987), and Kraus (1983) for a comprehensive discussion of the
measurement of decentralization. With regard to the limitations of fiscal indicators based on GFS data, see also Ebel and
Yilmaz (2003) and the World Bank decentralization project.
13See, e.g., Zimmermann (1973).
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ernment, mentioning, among others, detailed directives, involvement in the selection of
administrative staff, frequency of consultation, and the extent of supervision. Smith
(1979) and Bahl (1999) provide comprehensive discussions of factors which together de-
scribe the extent of fiscal decentralization, ranging from elected local councils, locally
appointed chief officers, institutional provisions, the size and number of sub-national
authorities, organizational structures, to fiscal indicators of expenditure, tax-raising and
borrowing powers.14 For example, the extent to which central government controls the
deployment of local administrative personnel, or supervises local government activity, or
the right of sub-central governments to appoint judges or to have separate police forces
play an important role. Certain studies therefore employed as a non-fiscal indicator of
decentralization the ratio of sub-central government employment to total government
employment.15
Focusing on the size and number of sub-central authorities, the population-normalized
number of sub-central jurisdictions,16 or even the number of tiers of sub-central govern-
ment have been occasionally used as alternative measures of decentralization. Larger
authorities might be expected to be more autonomous since they have greater political
and financial power. On the other hand, the reorganization of local communities into
greater local units has a centralizing effect from the point of view of the municipalities
involved.17 It is also doubtful whether multi-tiered sub-central government systems –
which, e.g., have an intermediate level – are to be considered more decentralized than
single-tiered systems.18 On the one hand, in multi-tiered systems it becomes more diffi-
cult for the center to control the lower levels of government. From the point of view of
the lowest levels of government, however, this implies decisions being taken by a more
remote body. Generally speaking, even if providing some information on the number
of veto players, indicators of decentralization which compare the sheer number of sub-
central jurisdictions with different statutes and degrees of autonomy across countries
seem quite problematic and require stringent common definitions.
A few recent approaches take account of vertical decision-making structures in analyzing
the degree of fiscal decentralization. Fiscal autonomy of sub-national governments is
generally determined by the legislative competencies and the degree of discretion over
spending, and especially by tax-raising powers and debt-raising autonomy. A local unit
has full autonomy if it is not legally obliged to carry out a function or to raise a certain
tax, and if the output, or, respectively, the tax rate and base are not predetermined by
another unit of government.
With respect to the supply of public goods, the vertical fiscal imbalance, that is the
extent to which sub-central governments rely on central government grants to support
their expenditures, is occasionally used as a measure of expenditure autonomy.19 A more
comprehensive approach would imply breaking down sub-central government expendi-
ture by function and classification according to the degree of local discretion in legislation
and execution.20 Pola (1999), e.g., carried out detailed surveys on behalf of the Euro-
pean Commission on the framework regulating sub-central government functions in 15
European countries. Sub-central services are classified as being performed exclusively by
the local or regional level of government, as being shared between them, or according to
14See also Treisman (2002).
15See, e.g., Arikan (2004). Stephens (1974) constructs a composite index of state centralization containing information
on financial responsibility, delivery, and distribution of public personnel between levels of government, in order to divide
up government services in central, local, and joint functions.
16See, e.g., Oates (1985).
17See Sharpe (1979).
18See also Oates (1972) on this issue.
19See the World Bank decentralization project.
20The Council of Europe (1997) provides a comprehensive discussion on different types of powers. See, also, the different
contributions in Ter-Minassian (1997), and the decentralization project of the World Bank.
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the degree of involvement of central government.21 However, no corresponding figures
on fiscal decentralization are reported.
Correspondingly, the degree of reliance on revenue from – formally – own resources
(own revenue) is quite often used as an indicator of revenue autonomy of sub-central
governments. This indicator is defined as the ratio of revenue exclusive of received
intergovernmental transfers to total revenue of sub-central governments.22 However, it is
questionable whether increased reliance on central government grants is to be considered
as centralizing in terms of reduced autonomy of sub-central governments.
As mentioned before, these measures of financial autonomy fail to capture decision-
making structures especially concerning tax revenue assigned to sub-central governments.
Pola (1999) provided detailed comparative institutional surveys and also some figures on
the degree of self-financing of local and regional governments in EU countries. Blankart
(1999) uses the share of general government tax revenue which is determined by central
government legislation as a measure of fiscal centralization in order to detect long-term
trends in Germany and Switzerland. Aiming at improving the quality of budgetary
statistics, the OECD recently provided a comprehensive methodological framework for
classifying taxes and tax revenues of sub-central government according to the degree of
tax-raising autonomy. Based on the Revenue Statistics, detailed figures are reported for
a number of OECD and EU accession countries for 1995/1997 on the revenue structure
of different sub-national levels of government.23 Drawing on this study, Ebel and Yilmaz
(2003) represented fiscal decentralization in terms of the ratio of own taxes which are
controlled by sub-central governments to total sub-national revenue.
3 Indicators of revenue decentralization
In spite of the problems of aggregation and representation of all aspects of fiscal de-
centralization discussed above, aggregate measures based on budgetary data which are
complemented with information on decision-making powers have the definite advantage
of being operational. Even though local discretion on the supply of public goods may play
an important role, it is widely accepted that the provision with own financial resources
is a crucial condition for sub-national autonomy vis-a`-vis the central government and
real fiscal decentralization. Both the scope of public spending and the extent of inter-
jurisdictional competition are determined by the degree of sub-national control over its
own resources. In view of this, the present paper focuses on the revenue side of fiscal
decentralization.24
Extending previous approaches to the measurement of sub-national tax autonomy, we
provide alternative quantitative measures of both tax autonomy and revenue decentral-
ization which take tax-raising powers of sub-central governments into account. Three
aspects seem to be important for the classification of sub-national taxes in decreasing
order of fiscal autonomy: legislative competencies to determine tax base and tax rate,
the attribution of the tax receipts, and tax administration. One might add the right
to choose the tax instrument, distinguishing between compulsory and voluntary taxes,
depending on whether a certain tax has to be levied or this rests at the discretion of
the local authority. Only taxes which can be chosen independently, and upon which
21See also Owens and Norregaard (1991) for a similar analysis.
22See OECD (1997).
23See OECD (1999). Based on a joint initiative together with the World Bank and the Council of Europe, among
others, the OECD carries out since 2000 surveys on the design of fiscal systems across levels of government for a group of
countries. The first results were presented for six EU-accession countries, see OECD (2002a).
24Apart from this, the appropriate quantification of expenditure decentralization involves serious difficulties related to
the lack of sufficiently disaggregated data on government functions, and the assessment of local discretion.
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sub-central levels of government have own legislative and administrative powers ensure
complete financial autonomy.
Concerning the classification of tax revenues according to the degree of control of sub-
central governments upon them, Pola (1999), e.g., distinguishes between own (autonomous)
taxes, devolved taxes managed by the central government, but the receipts of which ac-
crue to sub-central government, and taxes shared with the central government. The
OECD approach mentioned above provides a more detailed classification of tax auton-
omy:
Classification of taxes (in decreasing order of control over revenue sources)
(a) sub-central government (SCG) determines tax rate and tax base
(b) SCG determines tax rate only
(c) SCG determines tax base only
(d) tax sharing:
(d.1) SCG determines revenue-split
(d.2) revenue-split only changed with consent of SCG
(d.3) revenue-split unilaterally changed by centr. gov. (CG) (fixed in legislation)
(d.4) revenue-split unilaterally changed by CG (in annual budgetary process)
(e) CG determines tax rate and tax base
Source: OECD (1999).
In cases (a) to (c), which are referred to as “own taxes”, sub-central government has total
or significant control over its taxes, whereas in case of the revenue sharing categories (d.1)
to (d.2) it has some limited control through mechanisms of co-decision. For tax revenue
categories (d.3) to (e) sub-central government has no control at all, these resembling to
unconditional general purpose grants. Based on the 4-digit classification of taxes by the
base of the tax reported in the annual Revenue Statistics,25 the OECD survey classifies
each tax, the receipts of which are assigned to sub-central governments, according to
the degree of decision-making autonomy as presented above. The taxes are subsequently
weighted with the corresponding share in total tax revenue of sub-central governments.
In the following, we apply this methodology with some minor changes to derive a set of
different indicators of revenue decentralization. An aggregate measure of tax autonomy
of sub-central governments can be derived either by using a qualitative scale for the
different tax categories (a) to (e) which reflects the decreasing extent of discretion, or,
simply by summing up the different taxes which only accrue to sub-central levels of
government (own taxes) and which are significantly controlled by them, weighted with
the corresponding shares in their total tax revenue. Even if no distinction is made
between the different types of autonomous taxes, the last method avoids any problems
of arbitrary assessment and is therefore preferred here. A value of 100% then indicates
full autonomy26 The degree of tax autonomy accounting for autonomous own taxes is
thus defined as:
TAut1 =
SCG own tax revenue (a) to (c)
SCG total tax revenue
(1)
25Note that the Revenue Statistics attributes the following tax revenues to sub-national governments: local taxes
collected by them, surcharges on national taxes, and automatically received shares of taxes collected by the central
government in their territory.
26Note that this measure is slightly different from the tax autonomy indicator presented in Ebel and Yilmaz (2003)
which relates own taxes to total sub-national revenues.
6
Since especially in federal or quasi-federal countries like Austria, Germany, Spain, Switzer-
land, and, most recently, Belgium, regional or state governments have some influence on
the revenue-split of certain shared taxes, one might consider additionally revenue from
shared taxes as partly autonomous, too. Unlike intergovernmental transfers, tax revenue-
sharing is in general fixed by law or constitution and therefore has a more permanent
nature. This alternative indicator then denotes the extent to which sub-central govern-
ments (SCG) have full or at least some limited control over their tax revenues:
TAut2 =
SCG own tax revenue (a) to (c) + shared tax revenue (d.1) to (d.2)
SCG total tax revenue
(2)
According to the discussion in section2, decision-making autonomy represents only one
dimension of decentralization. The scope of sub-central activity has to be taken into
account, too. Therefore, the receipts from the different taxes of sub-central governments
(SCG)27 are classified according to the degree of decision-making autonomy and set in
relation to tax revenue of consolidated general government (GG) in order to measure
the degree of tax decentralization. In the case of federal states where local taxes or
regional/local revenue-sharing are determined by regional or state governments, these
are classified as autonomous taxes, since we now focus on the degree of fiscal autonomy
vis-a`-vis the central government. In doing so, local governments are treated as an integral
part of the intermediate level of government.
The measures of tax revenue decentralization which account for autonomous own taxes
of sub-central governments only (TDec1), or additionally for autonomous shared taxes
(TDec2), too, are presented below and compared to the conventional measure of de-
centralization based on total sub-national tax revenue as reported in financial statistics
(TDec3):
TDec1 =
SCG own tax revenue (a) to (c)
GG total tax revenue
(3)
TDec2 =
SCG own tax revenue (a) to (c) + shared tax revenue (d.1) to (d.2)
GG total tax revenue
(4)
TDec3 =
SCG total tax revenue (a) to (e)
GG total tax revenue
(5)
Extending the analysis to all sources of public revenue, non-tax revenue, such as user
charges or operational surplus of public enterprises, and capital revenue could be clas-
sified as own autonomous revenue.28 From the point of view of expenditure autonomy,
general purpose and unconditional specific purpose grants attach no constraints on how
the grants are spent, and might therefore be classified as own revenues of sub-national
governments.29 In contrast to this, conditional specific purpose grants are earmarked for
particular purposes and therefore offer only little discretion concerning their use. How-
ever, with respect to financial autonomy, it is irrelevant whether the funds can be spent
27Note that regional and local levels of government are consolidated now, local taxes being classified as described below.
28Due to the complexity of this area, possible limitations imposed by central legislation on the levying of user charges
are not taken into account here.
29See, e.g., Wasylenko (1987), and Ebel and Yilmaz (2003).
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independently, but instead whether the revenues are generated autonomously by sub-
central governments. In contrast to revenue-sharing, general purpose grants are usually
not fixed in legislation, but unilaterally during the annual budgetary process, therefore
remaining at the discretion of the central government and depending on its financial
situation. Since sub-central governments have no control over the amount and structure
of these revenues, it seems reasonable to classify all types of intergovernmental grants as
non-autonomous revenue corresponding to the OECD category (e) of tax autonomy.30
For reasons of aggregation across different levels of government, the corresponding degree
of revenue decentralization is then derived excluding intergovernmental grants received
from other levels of government. Again, apart from own non-tax and capital revenue, we
consider alternatively only autonomous own taxes of sub-central governments (RDec1),
autonomous own and shared taxes (RDec2), and total sub-national tax revenue as re-
ported in financial statistics (RDec3):
RDec1 =
SCG own tax rev. (a) to (c) + non-tax & capital rev.
GG total tax rev. + non-tax & capital rev.
(6)
RDec2 =
SCG own tax r. (a) to (c) + sh. tax r. (d.1) to (d.2) + non-tax & cap. r.
GG total tax rev. + non-tax & capital rev.
(7)
RDec3 =
SCG total tax rev. (a) to (e) + non-tax & capital rev.
GG total tax rev. + non-tax & capital rev.
(8)
Further possible extensions of the OECD approach might imply the differentiation of
autonomous taxes in view of considering the degree of discretion on choosing the taxing
instruments (compulsory vs. voluntary taxes), the limits imposed on setting tax rates
or tax bases, or the distinction between own taxes and taxes levied as a surcharge on
national taxes (piggybacked taxes).31 Since any attempt to qualify the different types of
autonomous taxes or other similar revenue sources by means of rankings bears serious
problems of arbitrariness, we refrain from going into further detail here. Particularly
the share of autonomous own tax, and, respectively, own revenue of sub-central govern-
ments, in total tax, and, respectively, total revenue of consolidated general government
(indicators TDec1 and RDec1) provide fairly good approximations of the degree of decen-
tralization. Since these two indicators are expected to best reflect real decision-making
powers, the investigation below will particularly focus on them. However, as already
pointed to in section 2, the general question still arises whether countries with an inter-
mediate level of government are to be considered as more decentralized than countries
without such a level, even if the degree of tax revenue decentralization might be the
same.
30This is also in accordance with the OECD taxonomy which does not take into account the degree of discretion over the
use of shared or ceded tax receipts. Of course, this might be different in federal or quasi-federal states where sub-central
governments participate in decision-making upon the allocation of grants.
31See also OECD (1999) for a discussion.
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4 A current overview of OECD countries
Using the latest data reported in the Revenue Statistics and taking account of the legal
assignment of legislative powers for each tax actually in force during the period investi-
gated, we provide an update of the OECD (1999) study concerning the classification of
taxes of sub-central governments in terms of tax-raising autonomy. For this purpose each
local tax has been investigated on an annual basis in terms of decision-making powers of
sub-national government. The sample consists of 23 OECD countries, including also new
countries not considered in the OECD survey.32 Going beyond the OECD approach, cur-
rent figures on revenue autonomy of sub-central governments and fiscal decentralization
are derived applying the different measurement concepts described above.
For reasons of consistency and comparability, the degree of tax autonomy is only de-
rived according to the provisions fixed in legislation, and, particularly, the extent of
participation of sub-central governments in decision-making. Therefore, the actual im-
plementation is not taken into account, focusing only on the potential degree of fiscal
autonomy.33 As far as possible, the different tiers of sub-national government are dealt
with separately. In doing so, one must take into account that especially in federal
countries local government taxes are regulated by regional or state legislation, without
implication of the central government. Therefore, own local taxes and taxes shared with
regional or state governments have to be classified in accordance with the degree of
control exercised by the upper sub-central level of government.
To begin with, Table 1 presents more recent figures for the classification of different taxes
of sub-central governments according to the scheme proposed by the OECD. The first
three columns indicate a very high degree of fiscal autonomy in most OECD countries,
sub-central governments controlling nearly all tax revenue accruing to them.34 This
is especially the case for state or local governments in federal states like Australia,35
Canada, Switzerland, or the USA, as well as for local governments in unitary states
like the Scandinavian countries, Netherlands, or the UK. In contrast to this, state, and,
to a lesser extent, local governments in Austria and Germany barely enjoy true fiscal
autonomy. Only when taking into consideration the participation in decision-making on
the allocation of shared taxes, a certain degree of autonomy can be ascribed to these
countries. This provides some quantitative evidence for the wide-spread view in public
finance literature which describes both countries as centralized federal states. Local
governments in Greece, Ireland and Portugal are also found to rely heavily on non-
autonomous revenue.
In order to compare the degree of sub-national fiscal autonomy across countries, Figure
1 illustrates the two indicators of tax autonomy for consolidated sub-central levels of
government. Once again, sub-central governments in Austria and Germany are shown
to have the lowest degree of real tax autonomy among the OECD countries analyzed,
only comparable to Greece.
Figure 2 presents the different measures of tax decentralization for the OECD countries.
In terms of real fiscal autonomy (indicator TDec1), Greece, Ireland, Austria, Portugal,
32The focus is on developed economies with long-standing democratic traditions for which long time series are available.
Therefore certain countries reported in the OECD survey are not considered here. Instead of this, new countries have
been included in this study: Australia, Canada, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, and the United States.
33Note that our classification of certain taxes differs from the OECD survey. Just to give an example, in Norway
local governments choose de facto the same maximum local income tax rate, although, in principle, variation is allowed.
Whereas the OECD study therefore classifies this tax as a shared tax the revenue-split of which is determined unilaterally
by the central government (d.4), we consider this tax as autonomous (b).
34However, note that for certain countries the data allow no distinction between the different tiers of sub-central
government.
35Yet, Australian states themselves are highly centralized, granting no fiscal autonomy to their municipalities.
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Table 1: Taxes of sub-central levels of government according to the degree of autonomy, 2001
Country Lev. gov. (a) (b) (c) (d.1) (d.2) (d.3) (d.4) (e)
AUS Regional 100.0
Local 100.0
AUT Regional 2.4 97.6
Local 5.2 11.2 83.6
BEL Reg./Loc.a 3.7 51.3 44.4 0.3 0.3
CAN Regional 60.0 38.7 1.3
Local 7.9 87.3 4.8
DEN Local 94.4 3.5 2.1
FIN Reg./Loc.a 0.0 83.0 17.0
FRA Reg./Loc.a 99.0 0.2 0.8
GER Regional 100.0
Local 1.0 55.3 43.6
GRE Local 13.9 41.9 44.2
ICL Local 7.2 92.8
IRL Local 55.1 44.9
ITA Reg./Loc.a 90.6 3.3 6.1
JAP Local 0.1 91.1 8.8
LUX Local 0.2 99.4 0.4
NED Regional 100.0
Local 3.3 96.7
NEZ Reg./Loc.a 98.8 1.2
NOR Local 98.2 1.8
POR Reg./Loc.a 6.7 29.9 13.9 49.5
SPA Reg./Loc.a 51.3 35.0 5.6 8.1
SWE Reg./Loc.a 0.0 100.0





Note: As per cent of total tax revenue of sub-central government. In case of various regional or local tiers of government,
these are consolidated at each corresponding level of government. a Due to problems of data identification, local and
regional level of government are consolidated. See Table 7 in the Appendix for an overview of the government structures.
Source for data: OECD, Revenue Statistics, latest year available. Source for tax classification: see Table 5.
and the United Kingdom exhibit the lowest degrees of decentralization with values below
5 %. Within this context note that the scope of sub-central government activity plays an
important role. Although local governments in certain countries like Netherlands, New
Zealand, or the UK have maximum levels of fiscal autonomy, their share in total public
sector activity is rather small. As expected, federal states like Switzerland, Canada,
and the USA belong to the most decentralized countries. Surprisingly enough, however,
unitary countries like Sweden, Denmark, and Japan exhibit very high degrees of tax
decentralization, thus contradicting, at least in terms of budgets, the presumption that
single-tiered or unitary systems are more centralized than multi-tiered or federal systems.
The situation changes considerably for countries like Austria, Belgium, or Germany,
when shared taxes co-determined by sub-central levels of government are further taken
into account (indicator TDec2). Considerable differences between the conventional mea-
sure of decentralization using total tax revenue of sub-central governments (indicator
TDec3) and the measure accounting for fiscal autonomy are also found for Finland,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Portugal, and Spain. This picture clearly illustrates that
10









































































autonomous own taxes (TAut1)
auton. own and shared taxes (TAut2)
Note: Local and regional government are consolidated. Three-year-average. See the text for a description of the two
indicators. Source: See Table 5.
conventional revenue shares reflect the degree of fiscal decentralization correctly only if
sub-central governments have entire control upon their revenue, as is the case, e.g., in
the USA, Canada, or Sweden.36 For most countries, however, such as particularly Aus-
tria, Belgium, Germany, or Portugal the degree of real fiscal decentralization is clearly
overestimated by the indicators commonly used in empirical studies.
With respect to total revenue of sub-central governments, the results are quite similar.37
Note, however, that with few exceptions the degree of revenue decentralization is gen-
erally higher as compared to tax revenue. Particularly for Australia, Austria, Germany,
Ireland, Netherlands, and the USA this reflects significant reliance of local governments
on non-tax revenue such as user charges.
These approaches to quantifying tax-raising autonomy still suffer, however, from certain
limitations related to differences between practice and legal provisions, and to prob-
lems of data disaggregation. Concerning the latter aspect, for certain countries the data
allow no distinction between regional and local government, or between different tiers
within the same level of government.38 Also, the 4-digit tax classification of the Revenue
Statistics is often not detailed enough. The classification of some taxes according to
36Ebel and Yilmaz (2003) also note that misrepresentation of the degree of fiscal decentralization might be more serious
for developing or transition countries, where local governments have no discretion over revenue and expenditure at all.
37See Table 9 in the appendix.
38Note that the OECD (1999) survey reports data for the different levels of sub-central government, however, only for
1995.
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autonomous own taxes (TDec1)
auton. own and shared taxes (TDec2)
total tax revenue (TDec3)
Note: See the text for a description of the three indicators. Three-year-average. Source: See Tables 5 and 6.
the degree of autonomy might therefore be partly erroneous. Another major problem is
related to the horizontal aggregation of data across jurisdictions belonging to the same
level of government, but which are vested with different competencies.39 This is partic-
ularly the case of the regions with special status in France, Italy and Spain, or the home
rule territorial arrangements for the Portuguese islands of Madeira and Azores, and for
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, especially
in federal states, where the competencies of local governments are determined by state
legislation or constitution (e.g., USA, Canada, Switzerland, Australia), there are consid-
erable inter-state differences in the degree of tax autonomy granted to local governments.
A more correct measure might therefore consider the horizontal disaggregation of tax
revenue data by jurisdictions. However, due to the lack of appropriate data, this is not
feasible in the present analysis. Despite these limitations, the indicators accounting for
fiscal autonomy presented above definitively contribute to improving the measurement
of fiscal decentralization.40
Table 2 finally summarizes the different measures of fiscal decentralization. Conventional
measures of expenditure decentralization, and of tax and own revenue decentralization
are reported in the first two columns, and, respectively, in the columns (5) and (7).
GFS data from the IMF are used to calculate the degree of expenditure decentralization.
39This is the case referred to as asymmetric fiscal decentralization in section 2. See, also, IMF (2001) with respect to
problems of horizontal aggregation.
40Note that in the present sample the coefficient of correlation between the degree of tax autonomy (TAut1) and the
corresponding degree of tax decentralization including only autonomous taxes (TDec1) is 0.50, as compared to 0.14 when
considering the common measure of tax decentralization (TDec3).
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Table 2: Summary of different indicators of fiscal decentralization, OECD countries, 1996-2001
EDec1 (1) EDec2 (2) TDec1 (3) TDec2 (4) TDec3 (5) RDec1 (6) RDec3 (7)
AUS 48.3 31.6 20.9 20.9 20.9 31.6 31.6
AUT 47.5 33.8 3.5 28.7 28.7 14.1 34.7
BEL 39.5 33.8 24.2 44.2 44.5 24.7 44.0
CAN 63.7 56.5 52.4 52.4 52.4 56.7 56.7
DEN 59.9 36.1 31.8 31.8 33.6 32.3 33.8
FIN 45.2 34.7 25.3 25.3 30.4 31.3 35.1
FRA 32.2 21.5 19.2 19.2 19.4 23.1 23.2
GER 64.6 60.2 7.3 49.6 49.6 20.8 50.1
GRE 5.6a 3.5a 0.2 0.2 2.0
ICL 33.7 30.1 24.7 24.7 24.7 25.4 25.4
IRL 28.4 7.4 2.3 2.3 3.9 9.4 10.3
ITA 36.3 17.2 8.6 8.6 13.1 9.9 15.0
JAP 62.8 27.6 36.7 36.7 40.5
LUX 27.6 17.5 8.3 8.3 8.3 13.3 13.3
NED 45.9 13.7 5.1 5.1 5.1 14.7 14.7
NEZ 11.1 10.0 5.7 5.7 5.8 9.2 9.3
NOR 46.1b 32.7b 22.6 22.6 23.0 24.9 25.2
POR 13.7 9.0 3.1 3.1 8.4 6.3 10.5
SPA 63.4 30.8 20.8 23.2 25.2 20.7 25.8
SWE 42.0 34.8 43.7 43.7 43.7 40.0 40.0
SWI 78.2 62.2 53.9 57.8 57.8 60.7 63.6
UK 31.6b 19.3b 4.9 4.9 4.9 9.2 9.2
USA 60.2 49.9 36.3 36.3 36.3 46.3 46.3
Note: (1)-(2) Total expenditure and lending minus repayments of sub-central government in % of consolidated general
government expenditure, without social security and EU payments; for JAP only current expenditure (revenue); (1) direct
expenditure, excluding transfers to other levels of government; (2) total expenditure, including transfers to other levels
of government net of received transfers. (3)-(5) Tax revenue of sub-central government in % of consolidated general
government tax revenue, without social security and EU payments: (3) autonomous own taxes, (4) autonomous own and
shared taxes, (5) total tax revenue of sub-central governments. (6)-(7) Own revenue of sub-central government, excluding
received transfers from other levels of government, in % of consolidated general government revenue, without social security
and EU payments: (6) autonomous own taxes and own non-tax and capital revenue, (7) total own tax, non-tax and capital
revenue of sub-central government. Six-year-averages, a 1981-82, b 1988-90. Source: for (1)-(2) IMF, Government Finance
Statistical Yearbook (except for: BEL – Banque Nationale de Belgique, JAP – OECD, National Accounts); for (3)-(7)
OECD, Revenue Statistics. Own calculations.
Problems regarding the appropriate treatment of intergovernmental transfers when ag-
gregating expenditure data across different levels of government are taken into account
by attributing intergovernmental transfers to the recipient, and, alternatively, to the
granting level of government.41 In the first case, intergovernmental transfers from lower
levels of government are attributed to the central government, the degree of decentral-
ization thus reporting only amounts spent or administered directly by the sub-central
level of government (direct expenditure, indicator EDec1). In the second case, sub-central
government spending includes intergovernmental expenditure, too, but excludes intergov-
ernmental revenue from central government (total expenditure, indicator EDec2). Then,
all public expenses financed from formally own resources are taken into account. This
seems particularly reasonable when the grantor prescribes the use of these funds (condi-
tional grants). However, in case of unconditional grants, it would be more appropriate
to attribute these funds to the recipient.
The figures indicate large disparities between the different indicators. The degree of
decentralization is in general found to be lower for revenue than for expenditure accord-
41See Oates (1972), Levin (1990), and Kraus (1983).
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ing to the unadjusted indicators, which indicates positive net vertical transfers to the
sub-central levels of government. As expected, the sub-national share of public spending
seems to be lower for total expenditure (EDec2) than for direct expenditure (EDec1),
since received intergovernmental grants are deducted. In most cases, own revenue figures
(RDec3) prove to be a good approximation of total expenditure, which is due to the fact
that total expenditure indicate the level of government financing the public functions.
Just as with tax revenue, both federal countries like Canada, Switzerland, or the USA,
and unitary countries like Denmark, Japan, or Spain have the highest degrees of de-
centralization in terms of direct expenditure. Note, also, that Germany belongs after
Switzerland to the most decentralized countries according to figures not accounting for
decision-making structures. As can be seen again, the differences between indicators
taking the extent of tax autonomy into account (especially TDec1 and RDec1), and
conventional revenue measures are quite considerable in several cases.
5 Decentralization trends in OECD countries
In the following, the long-term development of the vertical government structure of
OECD countries is analyzed in order to detect possible decentralization trends. Using
annual data reported by the IMF and the OECD, both conventional measures of decen-
tralization and the indicators accounting for decision-making competencies are employed.
In case of the latter, changes in the assignment of tax-raising powers in the course of
time are explicitly taken into account.
The most prominent examples of fiscal decentralization during the last three decades
are certainly Belgium and Spain.42 In Belgium the process of decentralization started
in 1970 with the creation of regions and communities and their subsequent endowment
with expenditure and tax-raising competences in the 1980s, and culminated in the cre-
ation of a federal state in 1994. After the end of the Franco regime, local autonomy has
been (re-)established in Spain and legislative powers and taxes have been transferred
particularly to the newly created autonomous regions. Yet, the process of devolution
is still open in both countries. Similarly, in Canada increasing separatism has led to
the strengthening of the autonomy of Que´bec. Apart from these examples, devolution
of expenditure and tax-raising powers particularly to regional governments can be ob-
served in France, Italy, Denmark, Portugal and Greece. Most recently, in the United
Kingdom a Scottish and a Welsh parliament have been created and endowed with limited
legislative and administrative autonomy. And even in federal countries like Germany or
Austria decentralization of responsibilities is currently gaining momentum in the public
discussion.
Table 3 presents a quantitative overview of the development according to the conven-
tional fiscal indicators described in section 2 and presented in Table 2. Drawing on
budgetary data for 23 OECD countries reported by the GFS of the IMF for the period
1970 to 2001,43 consolidated sub-central government expenditure and revenue are set in
relation to consolidated general government expenditure, and, respectively, revenue ap-
plying the concepts described above. According to the financial statistics, social security
payments and contributions are considered first as part of consolidated central govern-
ment. Endowed with own budgets and decision-making autonomy, these corporations
have to be considered as a distinct centralized level of government, since services are
provided on a nationwide scale.44
42A broad descriptive overview of the most significant institutional changes with respect to both expenditure and
tax-raising competencies is provided in the appendix.
43Note that the time periods available for the individual countries are of different length.
44Note that extra-budgetary accounts are included in consolidated central government, too.
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Table 3: Degree of fiscal decentralization (incl. social security), OECD countries, 1970-2001
Country Direct expenditure (1) Total expenditure (2) Own revenue (3)
1970-75 1996-2001 1970-75 1996-2001 1970-75 1996-2001
AUS 49.3 48.3 27.4 31.6 24.0 32.9
AUT 33.1 32.0 25.2 22.8 27.2 24.9
BEL 14.6 27.8 7.7 25.2 7.5 26.1
CAN 57.7 60.0 48.3 53.2 47.8 52.4
DEN 59.2 55.6 29.4 33.5 29.5 32.4
FIN 36.8 38.3 26.3 29.4 27.0 31.1
FRA 17.5 18.2 10.8 12.1 8.7 13.5
GER 44.1 36.1 39.7 33.4 37.4 32.7
GRE 3.9 3.7 3.5
ICL 17.7 28.2 17.8 25.1 18.9 23.8
IRL 28.3 24.9 16.5 6.6 14.1 7.0
ITA 17.8 24.9 7.9 11.7 5.5 11.6
JAP 48.4 35.8 22.9 18.4 25.7 23.5
LUX 16.4 15.5 8.8 10.0 8.3 10.0
NED 33.4 28.3 7.4 8.5 3.8 10.3
NEZ 12.5a 11.1 10.4a 10.0 11.3a 10.1
NOR 36.9 34.1 32.7 21.8 32.2 20.9
POR 6.8 10.1 3.4 6.6 4.2 6.4
SPA 9.8 35.8 5.4 17.4 5.1 18.1
SWE 43.5 36.3 32.5 30.1 31.9 29.7
SWI 57.8 49.6 49.9 44.0 47.3 43.5
UK 32.1 21.9 19.6 7.2 15.7 7.8
USA 44.4 47.6 35.7 39.5 39.3 41.6
Medianb:
OECD 33.2 33.1 21.3 22.3 21.5 23.7
EU15 30.2 28.1 13.7 14.8 11.4 15.8
Note: Total expenditure and lending minus repayments (total revenue and grants) of sub-central government in % of con-
solidated general government expenditure (revenue), without EU payments; for JAP only current expenditure (revenue).
Six-year-averages, a 1978-80, b without GRE. (1) expenditure excluding transfers to other levels of government (indica-
tor EDec1); (2) expenditure including transfers to other levels of government net of received transfers (indic. EDec2);
(3) revenue excluding received transfers from other levels of government (Indic. RDec3). Source: IMF, Government
Finance Statistical Yearbook (except for: BEL – Banque Nationale de Belgique, JAP – OECD, National Accounts). Own
calculations.
At first glance, the expenditure and revenue figures indicate no unique pattern of devel-
opment across countries.45 At least, with respect to total expenditure and own revenue,
the degree of decentralization has risen during the period of investigation in a majority of
OECD countries. As a result of the important constitutional changes, the sub-national
share of expenditure and revenue increased especially in Belgium46 and Spain, and also
to a lesser extent in Canada, Finland, France, Iceland, Italy, Portugal, and the USA. In
contrast to this, in many countries, among others Germany, Ireland, Norway, the United
Kingdom, and even Switzerland the degree of fiscal decentralization has declined. Fur-
thermore, European Union countries are found to be on average more centralized than
other OECD countries.
The picture changes to some extent when taking a closer look at the composition of
45This corresponds to earlier studies carried out by the OECD (2003) and Min˜ana (1998), who find clear evidence for
decentralization only with respect to expenditure.
46Note that the GFS classification considers Belgian regions and communities as central government units. Therefore,
previous studies using these data considerably underestimate the degree of fiscal decentralization in Belgium, particularly
from 1989 on. We use instead national statistics which distinguish the different levels of sub-national government.
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central government expenditure and revenue. In order to focus only on government
functions which could reasonably be decentralized according to the theory of fiscal fed-
eralism, social security has been removed from the central government sector (see Table
4).47 Now, the figures reveal on average a more pronounced process of decentralization
both in EU- and Non-EU-countries, especially with respect to the revenue side, where
17 out of 22 countries have higher decentralization levels at the end of the 1990s. A
strong process of decentralization of direct spending is notably found for Spain. These
quantitative figures seem to reflect quite well the devolution of competencies and the
strengthening of political autonomy of sub-central governments observed during the last
decades. The partly contradicting pieces of evidence in case of excluding social security
also indicate that the observed tendency to decentralize certain government activities
apparently interfered with the significant rise of the welfare state in most OECD coun-
tries.
Table 4: Degree of fiscal decentralization (excl. social security), OECD countries, 1970-2001
Country Direct expenditure (1) Total expenditure (2) Own revenue (3)
1970-75 1996-2001 1970-75 1996-2001 1970-75 1996-2001
AUS 49.3 48.3 27.4 31.6 24.0 32.9
AUT 45.8 47.5 34.9 33.8 35.1 33.4
BEL 21.0 39.5 10.0 33.8 10.2 35.4
CAN 58.5 63.7 49.6 56.5 49.3 55.8
DEN 61.8 59.9 30.7 36.1 30.3 33.8
FIN 42.6 45.2 30.3 34.7 30.3 34.7
FRA 29.0 32.2 18.0 21.5 13.5 22.3
GER 65.9 64.6 59.3 60.2 54.5 54.9
GRE 5.0 4.8 4.9
ICL 21.8 33.7 21.9 30.1 19.7 25.6
IRL 34.5 28.4 18.1 7.4 15.4 7.8
ITA 26.2 36.3 11.7 17.2 9.1 16.1
JAP 65.5 62.8 28.4 27.6 34.6 38.3
LUX 26.7 27.6 14.3 17.5 11.7 13.3
NED 53.2 45.9 11.6 13.7 5.9 16.2
NEZ 12.5a 11.1 10.4a 10.0 11.3a 10.1
NOR 48.1 46.1b 42.2 32.7b 40.9 27.2b
POR 9.3 13.7 4.7 9.0 6.0 8.7
SPA 15.6 63.4 8.7 30.8 8.2 26.6
SWE 48.0 42.0 35.8 34.8 35.9 34.4
SWI 74.4 78.2 63.3 62.2 62.3 63.0
UK 36.9 31.6b 22.4 19.3b 17.9 18.6b
USA 53.1 60.2 42.8 49.9 46.8 51.5
Medianc:
OECD 44.2 45.6 24.9 31.2 21.9 30.0
EU15 35.7 40.8 18.1 26.2 14.5 24.4
Note: Total expenditure and lending minus repayments (total revenue and grants) of sub-central government in % of
consolidated general government expenditure (revenue), without social security and EU payments. Six-year-averages, a
1978-80, b 1988-90, c without GRE. See Table 3 for further details.
According to the different patterns of development for expenditure and revenue, central
government grants to lower levels of government seemingly tend to be substituted with
own financial resources. Data on the share of revenue from – formally – own sources in
47Analogously, defense expenditure could be excluded, too. However, for the moment, we leave this to future research.
See, e.g., Wasylenko (1987).
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total revenue of sub-central government reported by the IMF48 confirm this. For regional,
as well as for local governments we find evidence for increasing reliance on revenue from
own sources – irrespective of the degree of control upon their allocation. Against the
general trend, the relative importance of intergovernmental grants has increased for local
governments in Germany, Ireland, Norway, and, particularly, the United Kingdom. The
figures also indicate that local governments in Australia, Austria, Greece, Iceland, New
Zealand, Norway and Switzerland, and La¨nder governments in Germany rely on average
only to a minor extent on grants from other levels of government.
However, as already discussed, no clear conclusions can be drawn from these figures, since
budgetary data not adjusted for decision-making structures provide no clear information
whether indeed fiscal powers have been transferred to lower levels of government in
the course of time. Therefore, focusing on the revenue side we employ the indicators
presented in section 3 in order to account for decision-making autonomy. The analysis
covers the period 1965-2001 for which data from OECD Revenue Statistics are available.
Based on 23 comprehensive surveys of national financial laws and constitutions for the
period of investigation, revenue data and the classification of autonomy are adjusted for
each sub-central government tax on an annual basis for changes occurring in the legal
provisions.49
Table 5 shows that the degree of tax revenue autonomy of sub-central governments barely
changes over time. A considerable increase in fiscal autonomy took place in France,
especially owing to the laws granting tax-raising powers to regions, de´partements and
municipalities at the beginning of the 1980s. With transition to democracy, sub-central
governments in Greece, Portugal, and Spain have been assigned formerly national taxes
and more legislative powers over already existing local taxes. In contrast to this, sub-
central government reliance on autonomous taxes has significantly declined in Ireland.
However, note that the measure of fiscal autonomy is quite sensitive to changes in the
assignment of taxes and tax competencies and to business cycles. Therefore, great leaps
should be treated with caution. As illustrated by the cases of Belgium or Italy, con-
solidated data on different tiers of sub-central government might be misleading, too.
The creation and endowment of regional governments with competencies and own rev-
enues in both countries reduced the measured consolidated degree of tax autonomy,50
though, as will be seen, on the other side, this implied an increase in fiscal decentraliza-
tion. These problems are therefore solved when focusing instead on the degree of fiscal
decentralization which accounts for the scope of sub-central government activity.
The development of the degree of tax revenue decentralization during the period 1965-
2001 is illustrated in Table 6 using the three different indicators elaborated in section
3.51 Though considerably differing in the level of decentralization measured, the indica-
tors mostly confirm the trend towards an increasing role of sub-central governments in
a majority of OECD countries. This is also true, even though to a lesser extent, when
considering only EU member countries. However, again, there is no uniform pattern
of development across countries. Pooled OLS regressions for different decentralization
measures corroborate these findings, providing evidence for a positive, but mainly statis-
48See Table 8 in the appendix.
49The overview in the appendix provides only a very broad description of the most important trends in tax-raising
autonomy. For the classification of taxes we have compiled more detailed annual information on the legislative competencies
of sub-central governments.
50This is especially due to the assignment of shared national tax receipts.
51The corresponding analysis of total revenue decentralization is provided in Table 9 in the appendix. However, data on
sub-national total revenue are missing for Greece and Japan, and are only available from 1975 on for the other countries.
Though not entirely comparable, the trends are quite similar to those reported for tax revenue. The entire time series
on the two most appropriate measures of tax and revenue decentralization, TDec1, and RDec1 are also reported in the
Tables 11 and 12 in the appendix.
17
Table 5: Degree of tax revenue autonomy of sub-central government, 1965-2001
Country Lev. gov. TAut1 (1) TAut2 (2)
1965-67 1999-2001 1965-67 1999-2001
AUS Regional 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Local 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
AUT Regional 1.9a 2.5 100.0 100.0
Local 16.9a 17.7 100.0 100.0
BEL Reg./Loc.c 92.6 55.0 92.6 99.3
CAN Regional 100.0 98.9 100.0 100.0
Local 100.0 95.0 100.0 95.0
DEN Local 96.7a 94.5 96.7a 94.5
FIN Reg./Loc.c 88.8 81.5 88.8 81.5
FRA Reg./Loc.c 12.1b 99.0 12.1b 99.0
GER Regional 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0
Local 55.6a 56.5 100.0 100.0
GRE Local 6.4a 13.8 6.4a 13.8
ICL Local 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
IRL Local 100.0 54.1 100.0 54.1
ITA Reg./Loc.c 97.1 89.8 97.1 89.8
JAP Local 88.1 91.0 88.1 91.0
LUX Local 100.0 99.6 100.0 99.6
NED Regional 100.0 100.0
Local 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
NEZ Reg./Loc.c 100.0 98.8 100.0 98.8
NOR Local 100.0 98.0 100.0 98.0
POR Reg./Loc.c 0.0 36.8 0.0 36.8
SPA Reg./Loc.c 65.4a 86.2 65.4a 92.0
SWE Regional 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Local 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
SWI Regional 93.5 88.9 100.0 100.0
Local 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
UK Local 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
USA Regional 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Local 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: As per cent of total tax revenue of sub-central government. In case of various regional or local tiers of government,
these are consolidated at each corresponding level of government. Three-year-averages. a 1973-75; b 1970; c due to
problems of identification, local and regional level of government are consolidated. Degree of tax autonomy as defined
in section 3: (1) autonomous own taxes, (2) autonomous own and shared taxes. Source for the data: OECD, Revenue
Statistics. Source for tax classification: OECD (1997, 1999, 2002b), Committee of the Regions (1999, 2000, 2001), Council
of Europe, European Commission (2002), Do¨hler (2002), Engel and van Ginderachter (1992), Fossatti and Panella (1999),
Norton (1994), Ter-Minassian (1997), Rahmann et al. (1994), and national fiscal constitutions and laws. Own calculations.
tically insignificant linear trend.52 Focusing on the indicator which best represents tax
autonomy (TDec1), we notice a significant increase of fiscal decentralization in Belgium
and Spain. Apart from these two cases, decentralization trends are reported in France,
Iceland, Italy, Japan, Portugal, and Sweden, too. On the other hand, sub-central govern-
ment has been pushed back in Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom.
This quantitative evidence seems to reflect very well the institutional changes taking
place in these countries.
With minor exceptions, this pattern of development is generally confirmed when adding
the revenue from shared taxes upon the allocation of which sub-central governments
have significant control (TDec2), or when considering total tax receipts irrespective of
52The regression results for different indicators of decentralization are provided in Table 10 in the appendix.
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decision-making structures (TDec3). However, the magnitude of the changes varies con-
siderably depending on the indicator employed.
Table 6: Degree of tax revenue decentralization, OECD countries, 1965-2001
TDec1 (1) TDec2 (2) TDec3 (3)
1965-67 1999-2001 1965-67 1999-2001 1965-67 1999-2001
AUS 19.6a 19.1 19.6a 19.1 19.6a 19.1
AUT 3.2a 3.2 29.5a 28.2 29.5a 28.2
BEL 6.6 24.6 6.6 44.4 7.2 44.7
CAN 52.1 51.8 52.1 51.8 52.1 51.8
DEN 27.4a 32.2 27.4a 32.2 28.4a 34.1
FIN 23.4 24.2 23.4 24.2 26.3 29.7
FRA 1.1b 18.4 1.1b 18.4 9.4b 18.6
GER 7.6a 7.2 48.3a 49.3 48.3a 49.3
GRE 0.3a 0.3 0.3a 0.3 4.9a 1.9
ICL 19.2a 25.3 19.2a 25.3 19.2a 25.3
IRL 12.8 2.2 12.8 2.2 12.8 4.0
ITA 6.3 11.2 6.3 11.2 6.5 14.8
JAP 28.6 37.5 28.6 37.5 32.5 41.3
LUX 10.0 7.9 10.0 7.9 10.0 8.0
NED 2.1a 5.1 2.1a 5.1 2.1a 5.1
NEZ 8.8 5.9 8.8 5.9 8.8 6.0
NOR 31.0a 21.4 31.0a 21.4 31.0a 21.8
POR 0.0 3.3 0.0 3.3 0.3 8.9
SPA 5.1a 22.3 5.1a 23.8 7.8a 25.9
SWE 32.0 42.8 32.0 42.8 32.0 42.8
SWI 54.0 53.0 56.0 56.9 56.0 56.9
UK 13.6 5.0 13.6 5.0 13.6 5.0
USA 34.5 35.6 34.5 35.6 34.5 35.6
Median:
OECD 12.8 19.1 19.2 23.8 19.2 25.4
EU15 6.6 7.9 10.0 18.4 10.0 18.6
Mean:
OECD 17.4 20.0 20.4 24.0 21.4 25.2
EU15 10.1 14.0 14.6 19.9 15.9 21.4
Std.dev.:
OECD 15.39 15.74 16.43 17.03 15.86 16.68
EU15 9.74 12.32 13.92 16.08 13.26 15.66
Note: Tax revenue of sub-central governments in % of consolidated general government tax revenue, without social security
and EU payments. Three-year-averages. a 1973-75, b 1970. Degree of tax revenue decentralization as defined in section 3:
(1) autonomous own taxes, (2) autonomous own and shared taxes, (3) total tax revenue of sub-central levels of government.
Source: see Table 5.
With regard to Germany, these figures confirm the results of the related analysis of
Blankart (1999) who identifies a process of “hidden centralization” in Germany, the
degree of tax revenue decentralization dropping from 40 % in 1950 to 7 % in 1995.53 At
the same time the trend in Switzerland went in the opposite direction, the degree of tax
decentralization increasing to 53 %. The figures for 1995 correspond exactly to the own
calculations reported in the third column of Table 6.
53Note that this considerable centralization occurred with the constitutional reforms of 1955 and 1969 which transferred
certain taxes from the La¨nder to the federal government and extended the scope of concurrent legislation. Since Revenue
Statistics data for Germany are only available from 1973 on, this process is therefore not reflected by the figures in the
present analysis.
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Even if this measure of fiscal decentralization accounts for decision-making competen-
cies, it still does not provide a remedy to all limitations of aggregate fiscal measures
described in section 2. Tax bases of central and sub-central governments typically have
different elasticities. Therefore, business cycles cause automatic fluctuations of the tax
revenue indicators, even though the assignment of competencies remains unchanged. For
example, the sub-national share of total tax revenue might fall when local governments
rely heavily on taxing relatively mobile bases.54 Yet, this could not be interpreted as
increasing fiscal decentralization. On the other side, fiscal decentralization might not
be depicted by the aggregate indicator, when, for instance, the transfer of tax-raising
powers to sub-central levels of government interferes with increasing revenue of central
government. Also, the shift from the positive to the regulatory state observed since
the late 1970s55 which implies central government increasingly relying on rules, norms,
and minimum quality standards, is not captured by fiscal data. Therefore, local fiscal
autonomy might be restrained without being adequately quantified.
However, in comparison to conventional measures, indicators accounting for decision-
making structures have the definite advantage of providing in most cases a better dis-
tinction between real fiscal decentralization and sheer revenue effects. Even if the as-
signment of tax receipts to levels of government remains unchanged, the extension of
legislative competencies upon these taxes is reflected by an increase in these indicators
of decentralization. Therefore, besides providing a better approximation for the actual
level of fiscal decentralization, changes in the vertical government structure are better
reflected, too.
6 Summary and conclusions
Motivated by increasing interest in public finance and practice on the comparison of
vertical government structures, this paper has given an analysis of the problems encoun-
tered in measuring the degree of fiscal decentralization and has provided an overview of
recent international trends.
Conventional measures of the degree of fiscal decentralization widely used in the literature
relate expenditure and revenue of sub-central governments to expenditure and revenue
of consolidated general government, as derived from financial statistics. However, the
discussion in this paper shows that these measures based on budgetary shares do not
appropriately capture decision-making structures and the extent of autonomy of sub-
central government upon the allocation of their expenditure and revenue. Due to these
measurement errors, the actual degree of fiscal decentralization tends to be overestimated
and especially the results of empirical studies using such fiscal indicators as explanatory
variables may be seriously distorted.
In view of the predominant importance of the provision with own financial resources for
sub-national autonomy and the scope of public spending, the present analysis focused
on the revenue side of fiscal decentralization. Drawing on a recent analytical framework
provided by the OECD, different indicators of tax autonomy and revenue decentralization
are constructed which take tax-raising powers of sub-central governments into account.
The new contribution consists both in deriving alternative measures of decentralization,
and in providing more recent figures and a comprehensive analysis of the long-term
development of vertical government structures in OECD countries. Based on the OECD
method of classification of local taxes according to the degree of discretion of sub-central




government revenue from taxes or other resources which are significantly controlled by
them in total revenue of consolidated general government. Using annual data for over 30
years reported by the Revenue Statistics and taking account of changes in the assignment
of tax-raising powers to sub-central governments on an annual basis, new time series are
provided for 23 OECD countries, including also countries not considered in the OECD
study.
The comparison of figures based on different measurement concepts indicates that com-
mon fiscal indicators considerably overestimate the degree of fiscal decentralization or
fiscal autonomy in most countries. Especially federal countries like Germany or Austria
are shown to be more centralized than unitary countries like Denmark or France. Only
when sub-central governments have considerable control over their financial resources,
common indicators are reasonable proxies of public sector decentralization.
With respect to the development over time, both conventional and improved indicators
provide strong evidence for increasing fiscal decentralization in a majority of OECD
countries during the last three decades. Particularly sub-central governments in Spain,
Belgium, France and Italy are increasingly relying on own autonomous revenues. How-
ever, no uniform pattern could be determined, several countries also exhibiting tenden-
cies to centralize government activity. Also, with few important exceptions, vertical
government structures seem to change only gradually in the course of time, displaying
significant inertia. Therefore, even longer periods of investigation might be necessary to
detect significant long-term trends.
To conclude, conventional expenditure and revenue shares are shown to often misrepre-
sent the actual level of fiscal decentralization, therefore being unsuited for cross-country
comparisons. On the other side, even though differing considerably in the magnitude,
both conventional and adjusted fiscal indicators seem to perform well in describing long-
term trends in the public sector. Despite several shortcomings related to aggregation and
the use of budgetary data, when adjusted for decision-making structures, expenditure
and revenue shares still have the definite advantage of being operational. The new data
set provided in this paper therefore might contribute to improving empirical studies on
fiscal decentralization.
Also, as suggested in this paper, the analysis of fiscal decentralization could analogously
be extended to classify sub-central expenditure or borrowing according to the degree of
autonomy. Generally speaking, it seems reasonable to use a set of different indicators
instead of a single measure in order to represent the different aspects of decentralization.
However, the measure of decentralization to be selected in empirical studies ultimately
depends on the specific purpose of the investigation.
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Appendix
Table 7: Levels of government, OECD countries
Country Regional level of governm. Local level of governm. Special status territor.




Canada provinces, territories municipalities
Denmark counties Faroe Isl., Greenland
municipalities
Finland municipalities auton. province Aland







Ireland counties, cnty. boroughs
boroughs, urban districts





Netherlands provinces polder boards
municipalities
New Zealand regional councils territorial authorities
Norway counties
municipalities
Portugal municipalities Azores, Madeira
parishes
Spain autonomous communities provinces historical regions
municipalities




United Kingdom counties, districts Scotland, Wales, N.Irl.
unitary authorities
United States states counties, districts
municipalities
Note: Units of government with own or assigned tax revenues. Own compilation.
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Fiscal decentralization in OECD countries (competencies, polit. autonomy), 1970-2004
AUS 1970s increasing overlap of central/state gov. competencies
AUT 1974, 1983/84, 1988 role of federal chamber and competencies of La¨nder strengthened
1992 agreement on const. reform (not implemented): devolution, abolition of direct state admin.
BEL 1970 creation of communities/regions, devolution of competencies to communities, co-decision rules
1980, 1988 devolution of legislative competencies to elected regional and community gov.
1994 constitutional reform: federal state
CAN 1982 constitutional reform: strengthening of the provinces
1987 const. reform (failed): strengthening of the provinces and of the autonomy of Que´bec
in the course of time federal gov. competencies delegated to provinces
DEN 1970 competencies of local gov. extended to all local affairs; reduction of state supervision
1976 responsibility for social security transferred to local gov.
1980s, 1990 further devolution of competencies
FIN 1976 strengthening of local self-government
1994-97 creation of self-governed regional councils responsible for regional development
FRA 1982-83 devolution competencies to subnat. gov., elected regional gov., reduced state supervision
2002 devolution competencies to subnat. gov.
2003-04 constitutional reform: devolution competencies to subnat. gov.
GER in the course of time increase of La¨nder participation in federal legislation
1992 extension of participation of La¨nder gov. in EU policy
GRE 1975 democratic constitution: creation of first level of local self-government
1986-87 administrat. decentralization, creation development regions
1994 creation of second level of local self-gov. (prefectures), extended competencies loc./reg. gov.
1997 creation of development regions with own budgets
1997-2001 devolution competencies to local gov.
2001 const. reform: strengthening of local self-government, reduced state supervision
ICL
IRL 1977, 1983, 1987 certain minor functions devolved to local gov.
1986, 1994 creation of regions as decentralized units of central gov.
1999 constitutional reform: recognition of elected local government bodies
ITA 1970 creation of regions with ordinary statute
1972, 1977 devolution of administrative competencies to ordinary regions, local gov.
1990-92 extension local/regional competen., local self-govern., subsidiarity, reduced state supervision
1993 direct election of mayors and province presidents
1997-98 devolution of competencies to regions/local gov. (“administrative federalism”)
1999 direct election of regional presidents
2001-03 const. reform: federalization, devolution of legislative competencies to regions, autonomy,
end of state supervision
JAP 1995 law to promote decentralization
LUX 1979 constitutional reform: local self-government
1988 extension of local self-government, reduction of state supervision
NED 1983, 1994 strengthening of provincial and local gov. vs. central gov.
NEZ 1974 creation of self-governed regional councils
NOR 1977 administrative independence of counties, strengthening of municipalities
POR 1976 democratic const.: local self-govern., devolution competencies, autonomy Madeira/Azores
1979 creation of development regions
1999 devolution competencies local gov., Madeira and Azores
SPA 1978 democratic constitution: regional and local autonomy
1981-83 creation of auton. regions, abolition state supervision, devolution competencies to regions
1992-93 extension of competencies of regions
SWE 1970 reduction of provincial gov. competencies
1997, 1999 creation of self-governed pilot regions, responsible for regional development
SWI reform of distribution of government functions currently planned
UK 1972 N. Ireland: abolition of self-government and dissolution of regional parliament
1973 extension of competencies of local gov.
1980-85 reduction of competencies of local gov.
1994 creation of administrative government offices for the regions (GOR)
1998 N. Ireland: restoration of self-government, election of regional parliament
1999 Scotl., Wales: elected parliaments, legisl. and admin. competencies, state supervision reduced
England: creation of regional development agencies (RDA), elected bodies planned
2000 London: direct election of council and mayor
USA extension of federal gov. legislation in areas of state and local gov. (e.g., social affairs)
Source: Constitutions and legal provision, see also Table 5. Own compilation.
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Fiscal decentralization in OECD countries (financial autonomy), 1970-2004
AUS 1971 cession of payroll tax to states
2000 cession of general sales tax receipts to states
AUT
BEL 1980 assignment of own revenues with limited legislative power to communities/regions
1989, 1994, 2001-02 extension of own sources and tax-rising powers of communities/regions,
co-decision on financing system
CAN
DEN 1996 complete cession of county land tax yield to counties
FIN
FRA 1980 tax-raising autonomy for direct local taxes
1983 cession of national taxes and legislat. competencies to de´partements/regions
1999-2001 abolition of certain local/regional tax bases
2003 constitutional reform: financial autonomy of subnat. gov.
GER 1969 const. reform: extension of concurrent competencies and cession of La¨nder taxes,
to central gov., revenue-sharing of personal and corporate income tax and VAT
1996 abolition of the La¨nder wealth tax
1997 communal enterprise capital tax replaced with share in VAT
GRE 1990 local gov. shares in national taxes
2001 constitutional reform: financial autonomy of subnat. gov.
ICL
IRL 1997 local gov. share of motor tax yield
ITA 1973-74 abolition of local taxes, centralization of tax administration
1989-93 substitution of grants with new local/regional taxes, legislative powers
1998 introduction of further regional/local taxes and surcharges to national taxes
2000 substitution of grants with regional share in national taxes
2001 constitutional reform: financial autonomy of local/regional gov.
JAP
LUX 1979 financial autonomy of local gov.
NED in the course of time abolition of certain local taxes
NEZ
NOR 1979 tax-raising power of counties, county income tax
POR 1979 own local taxes; special taxing powers Madeira and Azores
1989-90 new local taxes, legislative competencies of local gov.
1997 constitutional reform: local tax-raising powers
1999 local gov. share in national taxes
SPA 1981-82 cession of national and own taxes to regions, regional share in national taxes
1987 co-decision of regions on financing system, extended shares in national taxes
1988-90 new local and provincial taxes
1993 regional share in national income tax, extended legislat. competencies for shared taxes
1997 extended regional share in national income tax and additional regional surcharge, extended
legislat. competencies for regional shared taxes
2002 extended reg. share in national income tax and surcharge, cession of taxes to regions
SWE 1986 reduction of the local income tax base
1991-2000 temporary limits on local tax rates set by central gov.
SWI 1993 harmonization of cantonal tax legislations
UK 1980-84 reduction of legislative competencies for local taxes
1990 transfer of certain local taxes to central gov.
1999 tax legislative competencies for Scottish Parliament
USA
Source: Constitutions and legal provision, see also Table 5. Own compilation.
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Table 8: Own revenue of sub-central government, OECD countries, 1970-2001
Country Lev. gov. 1970-75 1996-2001
AUS Regional 46.0 61.0
Local 80.6 84.3




CAN Regional 76.1 85.1
Local 51.2 61.8
DEN Local 50.7 59.5
FIN Local 70.0 76.1
FRA Local 54.5 66.1
GER Regional 81.5 81.9
Local 69.5 66.7
GRE Local 85.6
ICL Local 90.6a 89.3
IRL Local 42.9 22.3
ITA Local 26.9 43.2
JAP Local 49.4 51.6
LUX Local 53.0 63.5
NED Local 12.0 33.5
NEZ Local 81.7b 91.1
NOR Local 82.8 61.4
POR Local 50.0 63.0
SPA Regional 19.3c 26.5
Local 51.9 65.9
SWE Local 70.6 82.6
SWI Regional 71.1 69.1
Local 82.2 84.1
UK Local 51.9 28.6
USA Regional 74.2 77.9
Local 60.4 62.1
Note: Revenue exclusive of intergovernmental grants received from other levels of government, in % of total revenue and
grants. Six-year-averages; a 1983-84, b 1978-80, c 1980. Source: IMF, Government Finance Statistical Yearbook (except
for: BEL – Banque Nationale de Belgique, JAP – OECD, National Accounts). Own calculations.
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Table 9: Degree of revenue decentralization, OECD countries, 1975-2001
RDec1 (1) RDec2 (2) RDec3 (3)
1975-77a 1999-2001b 1975-77a 1999-2001b 1975-77a 1999-2001b
AUS 23.9 30.8 23.9 30.8 23.9 30.8
AUT 13.3 13.2 35.5 33.8 35.5 33.8
BEL 7.2 25.0 7.2 43.7 7.3 44.0
CAN 54.7 56.6 54.7 56.6 54.7 56.6
DEN 31.8 32.7 31.8 32.7 32.6 34.3
FIN 33.1 30.0 33.1 30.0 35.2 34.3
FRA 6.2 22.8 6.2 22.8 15.3 23.0
GER 21.7 20.8 54.6 50.1 54.6 50.1
GRE
ICL 18.9 26.2 18.9 26.2 18.9 26.2
IRL 14.3 9.1 14.3 9.1 14.3 10.8
ITA 6.2 10.0 6.2 10.0 8.9 16.5
JAP
LUX 10.5 12.9 10.5 12.9 10.5 12.9
NED 7.6 13.7 7.6 13.7 7.6 13.7
NEZ 12.0 9.8 12.0 9.8 12.3 9.9
NOR 27.2 25.1 27.2 25.1 27.2 25.5
POR 4.1 7.4 4.1 7.4 10.3 11.7
SPA 11.8 24.7 11.8 25.8 14.7 27.5
SWE 42.9 38.5 42.9 38.5 42.9 38.5
SWI 63.8 60.1 66.5 63.0 66.5 63.0
UK 18.8 9.1 18.8 9.1 18.8 9.1
USA 41.1 45.8 41.1 45.8 41.1 45.8
Median:
OECD 18.8 24.7 18.9 26.2 18.9 27.5
EU15 12.5 17.3 13.0 24.3 15.0 25.2
Mean:
OECD 22.4 25.0 25.2 28.4 26.3 29.4
EU15 16.4 19.3 20.3 24.3 22.0 25.7
Std.dev.:
OECD 16.32 14.92 17.98 16.24 17.11 15.65
EU15 11.47 9.58 15.62 13.73 14.64 13.10
Note: Own revenue of sub-central government, excluding received transfers from other levels of government, in % of
consolidated general government own revenue, without social security and EU payments. Three-year-averages, a earliest
available years, b latest available years. Degree of tax revenue decentralization as derived in section 3: (1) autonomous
tax revenue, (2) limited autonomous tax revenue, (3) total tax revenue of sub-central levels of government. Source: see
Table 5.
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Table 10: Decentralization trends, OLS regressions, 1965-2001
Dep. Variable:
TDec1 TDec3 RDec1 RDec3
Trend 0.009 0.113 0.193 0.186
(OECD) (0.061) (0.062) (0.111) (0.118)
No. obs. 761 761 466 466
Trend 0.073 0.241 0.061 0.102
(EU15) (0.053) (0.063) (0.089) (0.122)
No. obs. 492 492 303 303
Note: Pooled OLS regression on a linear trend. Robust, heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors (in brackets).
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Table 11: Degree of tax revenue decentralization, OECD countries, annual figures, 1965-2001
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
AUS 19.68 19.28 19.94 19.77 19.72 19.58 18.85 18.19 18.30 19.24 19.49
AUT 2.90 3.09 3.62 3.61 3.47 3.36 3.35 3.39 3.50 3.53 3.67
BEL 6.59 6.70 6.64 7.30 6.18 6.69 6.40 7.07 6.33 6.72 6.30 6.09 5.98 6.11 6.19 5.31 5.65 6.48 6.33
CAN 52.14 52.38 51.86 51.21 49.15 49.79 49.56 49.27 47.26 46.31 47.08 49.37 52.91 54.28 52.77 51.64 49.43 51.24 53.03
DEN 27.35 25.96 29.02 29.17 28.65 27.89 28.62 28.68 28.92 29.63 30.22
FIN 23.14 23.47 23.54 22.67 24.37 24.19 24.82 23.88 23.85 24.62 26.90 25.90 27.13 26.41 27.30 25.65 26.21 26.60 26.50
FRA 1.13 1.93 1.63 2.18 2.06 2.25 2.28 2.39 11.85 11.96 11.97 12.83
GER 7.49 7.58 7.76 8.01 7.91 7.62 7.34 7.65 7.15 7.09 7.38
GRE 0.31 0.25 0.57 0.54 0.37 0.40 0.47 0.43 0.28
ICL 19.19 17.54 17.06 16.94 17.81
IRL 13.78 12.98 11.68 11.75 11.14 10.99 11.63 11.71 9.68 9.64 8.66 8.33 7.33 4.90 4.66 4.08 3.27 2.54 2.46
ITA 6.43 6.38 6.05 5.96 5.78 5.20 5.34 5.76 4.87 1.99 1.07 0.84 0.29 0.23 0.15 0.47 0.53 0.50 0.40
JAP 28.33 28.71 28.83 28.44 27.98 28.50 29.42 28.78 28.46 30.95 32.17 32.40 33.01 30.68 32.13 32.39 32.71 33.30 33.33
LUX 10.03 9.28 10.69 10.80 11.27 12.81 10.82 10.30 10.49 10.61 9.53 10.03 9.88 10.49 10.09 9.43 8.45 8.51 9.50
NED 2.19 2.29 1.92 2.35 2.83 3.56 3.36 3.21 3.73 4.13 4.13
NEZ 9.07 8.91 8.42 8.86 8.64 7.78 7.07 7.39 6.29 6.51 7.18 7.00 6.67 7.19 6.79 6.93 6.80 6.99 7.18
NOR 30.45 31.18 31.51 31.48 31.40 31.06 29.18 24.75 23.96 24.62 24.51
POR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.39 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.27 0.30
SPA 4.84 5.07 5.33 6.08 7.74 7.85 9.20 5.94 5.68 10.11 10.04
SWE 30.77 32.45 32.81 33.04 33.49 34.59 34.59 35.93 36.40 37.64 36.31 36.95 38.32 41.47 42.85 44.80 45.61 44.62 43.31
SWI 54.33 52.41 55.16 54.10 55.57 54.97 56.22 55.21 59.01 59.01 61.50 58.17 59.87 58.60 59.99 58.66 58.68 57.68 58.41
UK 13.77 13.80 13.08 12.47 11.56 11.41 12.41 13.75 14.25 13.02 13.56 13.18 13.03 12.94 13.28 13.04 13.90 14.07 13.45
USA 34.38 34.62 34.41 34.56 33.42 34.80 36.55 37.31 38.12 37.31 38.30 38.40 38.00 37.48 36.29 35.64 33.91 34.72 36.26
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
AUS 18.64 18.55 18.50 19.10 19.78 19.83 20.50 22.45 23.40 24.23 22.88 22.47 22.45 22.31 21.33 21.05 17.16
AUT 3.45 3.31 3.34 3.45 3.50 3.66 3.58 3.40 3.41 3.53 3.59 3.76 3.45 3.39 4.03 3.50 2.96
BEL 7.06 6.88 6.98 6.95 6.69 17.54 18.51 19.86 20.71 21.36 22.02 23.61 23.78 24.27 24.34 24.55
CAN 51.98 52.44 51.26 50.65 51.78 51.62 52.70 52.90 53.53 55.36 54.64 54.66 53.86 52.25 52.86 52.20 51.57 51.65
DEN 28.73 27.63 26.46 28.03 29.42 29.65 30.61 30.91 31.16 30.84 30.96 31.48 31.19 31.46 31.97 31.82 32.57
FIN 26.07 26.15 26.08 25.89 24.88 24.30 26.74 26.23 26.69 31.15 32.18 29.50 28.21 25.85 25.10 24.64 22.48 25.49
FRA 15.21 15.59 15.63 15.53 16.16 16.28 16.85 16.89 19.05 19.81 20.05 19.96 19.93 19.65 19.53 18.74 18.01
GER 7.74 7.89 7.91 7.59 7.90 7.62 7.81 7.00 6.81 6.96 6.79 6.49 7.20 7.65 7.61 7.47 7.29 6.87
GRE 0.23 0.26 0.05 0.10 0.28 0.31 0.26 0.24 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.24 0.27 0.25
ICL 19.34 19.05 18.73 19.20 20.01 20.41 20.52 21.69 22.29 22.54 21.62 22.17 21.60 25.69 24.95 24.80 24.86 26.39
IRL 2.56 2.72 2.71 2.78 2.61 3.07 3.00 2.99 2.94 2.87 2.76 2.81 2.66 2.46 2.33 2.14 2.11 2.26
ITA 0.43 0.42 0.18 0.48 1.18 1.26 1.25 1.31 5.32 5.01 5.23 5.67 5.90 6.19 5.86 13.74 14.12
JAP 33.53 34.07 33.18 33.18 33.44 32.74 31.79 32.68 34.34 33.69 33.72 34.13 35.00 35.17 37.54 37.68 37.00 37.91
LUX 8.75 9.27 9.15 8.69 8.58 9.25 8.74 9.18 7.95 8.42 7.98 9.07 8.91 8.42 8.60 7.79 7.84 8.14
NED 4.19 4.41 3.98 4.23 4.08 4.17 3.88 3.75 3.95 3.40 4.45 4.73 5.02 5.19 5.20 5.12 5.05
NEZ 6.69 6.37 6.02 5.72 5.52 5.19 5.97 6.04 5.33 5.45 5.31 5.17 5.51 5.29 5.77 6.19 6.05 5.53
NOR 23.48 23.11 24.73 27.12 28.58 28.53 27.56 27.15 27.78 27.53 27.47 25.53 24.74 23.53 23.44 23.45 20.53 20.15
POR 0.42 0.41 0.57 0.64 0.73 1.76 2.73 2.76 2.61 2.85 2.68 2.85 2.92 2.89 3.14 3.36 3.18
SPA 12.66 11.82 8.16 7.56 7.62 7.25 8.00 7.98 11.32 12.09 12.50 12.69 12.86 21.98 23.07 22.55 22.26 22.12
SWE 42.96 40.46 38.03 35.74 37.16 38.29 40.18 43.56 47.41 47.56 46.41 47.02 46.26 44.28 43.45 41.12 42.57 44.65
SWI 57.31 57.06 55.49 56.61 55.03 56.29 55.34 55.78 55.69 58.67 57.12 56.99 55.67 55.14 52.52 54.54 51.55
UK 13.17 12.89 13.57 14.04 13.86 13.75 7.29 4.74 5.28 5.20 5.04 4.88 4.77 4.81 4.76 4.98 4.82 5.07
USA 37.54 37.52 38.03 37.64 38.33 37.98 38.15 38.55 39.08 39.03 38.81 38.58 37.84 37.00 36.18 35.92 34.99 35.88
Note: Only including autonomous own tax revenue of sub-national governments (indicator TDec1).
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Table 12: Degree of revenue decentralization, OECD countries, annual figures, 1975-2001
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
AUS 23.86 23.66 24.11 24.20 23.51 22.96 23.10 24.18 25.18 24.29 24.95 25.48 25.53 26.74
AUT 13.42 13.28 13.26 13.10 12.99 13.78 13.85 14.29 14.71 14.04 13.87 13.58 14.00 14.55
BEL 7.23 7.34 6.69 6.55 7.19 7.24 7.97 7.88 8.07 8.16 8.03
CAN 54.66 53.46 51.47 53.55 54.62 53.61 54.43 53.24 52.82 54.55
DEN 31.90 31.48 32.14 31.07 31.27 30.40 30.84 31.39 31.69 30.04 29.09 27.92 29.30 30.49
FIN 33.51 32.41 33.46 33.28 32.02 31.38 31.10 31.48 31.62 31.44 32.02 30.78 30.65 30.42
FRA 6.15 6.13 14.67 14.66 14.82 15.64 17.76 18.26 19.21 19.31 19.86
GER 21.70 21.96 21.53 21.44 21.06 21.67 21.85 21.91 22.41 22.12 21.92 21.98 21.91 22.44
GRE
ICL 18.95 22.97 22.70 22.70 19.16 20.22 20.31 19.85 20.60 21.18
IRL 14.79 14.04 14.00 11.91 11.90 10.67 10.01 9.02 9.10 9.43 10.13 10.17 10.41 9.53
ITA 6.25 6.15 5.24 5.31
JAP
LUX 10.33 10.37 10.79 11.12 10.93 10.07 9.13 9.82 10.52 9.77 10.03 10.22 9.41 9.28
NED 7.06 7.66 8.16 8.98 9.00 8.71 9.29 9.93 10.44 10.62 10.64 10.00 10.51 9.89
NEZ 11.99 11.18 11.25 11.17
NOR 27.15 26.58 26.70 25.34 24.99 24.61 25.59 27.61 28.71
POR 4.13 4.46
SPA 11.77 11.79 11.55 10.36 9.96 13.50 14.00 15.23 16.90 13.01 11.69 11.92
SWE 42.86 43.90 45.86 46.63 45.21 43.83 43.71 41.65 38.70 36.05 37.50
SWI 64.69 62.52 64.18 63.51 64.68 63.81 63.97 63.30 64.04 63.31
UK 20.04 17.90 18.53 18.45 18.77 18.45 19.33 19.81 18.52 17.99 17.53 18.31 18.79 19.33
USA 41.08 39.63 40.73 42.31 43.75 44.00 45.34 45.33 45.85
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
AUS 27.77 28.56 31.25 32.27 32.94 31.93 31.70 31.82 32.03 31.79 30.80
AUT 14.94 14.66 15.08 15.08 15.64 15.89 17.66 16.16 13.00 13.95 13.21
BEL 18.04 18.88 20.42 20.99 21.34 22.12 23.95 24.13 25.03 24.96
CAN 54.56 55.58 55.54 56.30 58.18 57.95 57.87 57.17 56.20 56.57 56.99 56.39
DEN 30.61 31.39 31.08 31.16 30.43 30.94 31.94 31.66 32.04 32.41 32.52 32.83
FIN 30.01 31.96 33.41 34.70 32.33 33.07 33.74 32.63 31.37 29.95
FRA 20.03 20.40 20.42 22.47 23.24 23.68 23.58 23.34 22.79
GER 21.57 22.13 20.89 20.35 20.42 19.86 20.72 20.85
GRE
ICL 21.49 21.55 22.84 23.21 23.75 23.01 23.55 23.47 26.66 26.19
IRL 10.15 10.07 9.49 9.39 9.51 9.80 9.68 9.82 9.08
ITA 5.98 8.50 9.68 9.84 9.91 10.01
JAP
LUX 13.58 13.97 12.93 13.32 12.91 13.81 13.68 12.87
NED 10.41 9.64 13.25 13.01 11.87 14.70 13.88 15.66 13.70
NEZ 7.25 7.56 7.57 7.54 8.27 8.66 8.78 11.74 9.68 8.13
NOR 28.01 26.57 26.93 27.83 27.52 27.56 25.86 25.10 24.10 25.41 25.11
POR 4.99 5.00 6.33 4.94 5.35 4.99 5.19 5.46 6.04 7.38
SPA 12.11 12.62 12.55 14.69 15.27 16.65 16.14 16.75 24.67
SWE 38.29 39.69 41.69 44.62 39.89 38.94 42.87 42.01 39.67 39.65 38.53
SWI 64.03 61.38 61.95 64.44 63.26 62.97 61.91 61.70 59.76 61.41 58.79
UK 19.73 13.98 10.73 10.92 11.02 10.45 9.80 9.45 9.17 9.11
USA 45.46 46.02 46.21 47.25 46.86 46.76 46.25 46.97 46.50 46.38 46.07 45.60
Note: Only including autonomous own tax, non-tax and capital revenue of sub-national governments (indicator RDec1).
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